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Abstract
We suggest a new answer to this intriguing question and argue that
the answer may have implications for the solutions to the measurement
problem. The main basis of our analysis is the doctrine of psychophysi-
cal supervenience. First of all, based on this doctrine, we argue that an
observer in a quantum superposition or a quantum observer has a defi-
nite conscious experience, which is neither disjunctive nor illusive. The
inconsistency of this result with the bare theory is further analyzed,
and it is shown that an appropriate use of the strategy of analyzing the
disposition of an observer to answer a particular question also leads to
the same result. Next, we argue that this new result seems to disfavor
Everett’s and Bohm’s approaches to quantum mechanics when con-
sidering the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. This suggests
that dynamical collapse theories are in the right direction to solve the
measurement problem. Thirdly, we analyze the concrete content of
the conscious experience of a quantum observer. It is argued that the
mental content of a quantum observer is related to both the amplitude
and relative phase of each branch of the superposition she is physically
in, and it is composed of the mental content corresponding to every
branch of the superposition. In addition, we argue that when assum-
ing the modulus squared of the amplitude of each branch determines
the vividness of the mental content corresponding to the branch, the
structured tails problem of dynamical collapse theories can be solved.
1 Introduction
It has been realized that the measurement problem in quantum mechanics is
essentially the determinate-experience problem in the final analysis (Barrett,
1999). The problem is to explain how the linear dynamics can be compatible
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with the existence of our definite experience. This means that in order to
finally solve the measurement problem it is necessary to analyze the observer
who is physically in a superposition of brain states with definite conscious
experiences such as definite measurement records. Indeed, such quantum
observers exist in the main realistic solutions to the measurement problem,
including Bohm’s theory, Everett’s theory, and even the dynamical collapse
theories.1 Then, what does it feel like to be a quantum observer? In his
book Quantum Mechanics and Experience, David Albert first asked this
intriguing question and also suggested an interesting answer, the bare theory
(Albert, 1992, p.124). The theory was analyzed by several other authors
later (Barrett, 1994, 1998a, 1998b, 1999; Weinstein, 1996; Bub, Clifton and
Monton, 1998; Dickson, 1998; Magnus, 2004). Certainly, the above realistic
alternatives to quantum mechanics also give their respective answers. In
this paper, we will suggest a new answer to this question. Moreover, we will
argue that the suggested answer, if it is true, will have implications for the
solutions to the measurement problem.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we argue that a quan-
tum observer, like a classical observer, also has a (normal) definite conscious
experience. Two arguments are given. The first argument is based on the
doctrine of psychophysical supervenience, and the second argument is based
on Albert’s strategy of analyzing the disposition of an observer to answer a
particular question. In Section 3, we analyze the bare theory, which seems
to raise a serious objection to our arguments. According to the theory, a
quantum observer has a definite conscious experience, but the experience is
not normal but disjunctive and also illusive. It is argued that the bare the-
ory is based on a questionable analysis of how a quantum observer answers
a particular question, and it does not pose a threat to our arguments. In
Section 4, we discuss possible implications of the above analysis for the solu-
tions to the measurement problem. It is argued that Everett’s and Bohm’s
approaches to quantum mechanics are disfavored when considering the doc-
trine of psychophysical supervenience. It is also pointed out that although
dynamical collapse theories are favored, they are plagued by the structured
tails problem. In order to solve this serious problem, we further analyze the
concrete content of the conscious experience of a quantum observer in Sec-
tion 5. We argue that the mental content of a quantum observer is related
to both the amplitude and relative phase of each branch of the superposition
she is physically in, and it is composed of the mental content corresponding
to every branch of the superposition. In addition, we argue that when as-
suming the modulus squared of the amplitude of each branch determines the
vividness of the mental content corresponding to the branch, the structured
tails problem can be solved. Conclusions are given in the last section.
1Note that in the dynamical collapse theories there are also quantum observers due to
the imperfectness of wavefunction collapse, which leads to the well-known tails problem.
2
2 A quantum observer has a definite conscious ex-
perience
Suppose there is an ideal x-spin observer M who measures the x-spin of a
spin-l/2 system S without disturbing it. If the initial state is one where M
is ready to make a measurement and S is in an x-spin up eigenstate, then
after the measurement S will be still in the x-spin up state, and M will
physically record the x-spin up result and mentally have the corresponding
conscious experience whose content is that the measurement result is x-spin
up. Similarly, if S is initially in an x-spin down eigenstate, then after the
measurement S will be still in the x-spin down state, and M will physically
record the x-spin down result and mentally have the corresponding conscious
experience whose content is that the measurement result is x-spin down. The
evolution of the physical state of the composite system for these two cases
can be written as:
|up〉S |ready〉M → |up〉S |up〉M (1)
|down〉S |ready〉M → |down〉S |down〉M (2)
Then if M begins in a ready-to-make-a-measurement state and S begins in
a superposition of x-spin up and x-spin down
α |up〉S + β |down〉S , (3)
then by the linear dynamics the physical state of M and S after M’s x-spin
measurement will be
α |up〉S |up〉M + β |down〉S |down〉M . (4)
Now the question is: What conscious experience does M have when she
is physically in this superposition state? In order to answer this question,
we need to resort to certain fundamental assumptions about the relation-
ship between the physical state and the mental state. Here we resort to the
doctrine of psychophysical supervenience, which says two observers cannot
differ mentally without also differing physically, or in other words, two iden-
tical brain states or processes correspond to the same mental state. Note
that the existing neuroscience experiments support this doctrine, and no ev-
idence has been found to contradict it. Since a mental state not only has its
mental content but also has some other properties such as the vividness of
the content etc, the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience further means
that each of these properties also supervenes on certain aspect or part of
the physical state or process underlying the mental state. In other words,
if two different physical states or processes have some identical parts, then
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the two corresponding mental states will have the same mental properties
determined by these parts.
It can be seen that the mental states of M corresponding to the physi-
cal states |up〉M and |down〉M only differ in their content, and their other
properties are the same. Then the parts of the two physical states on which
these mental properties supervene are also the same.2 This means that
these parts will be a common factor which can be picked out from the above
superposition of the two physical states, (4). Then by the psychophysi-
cal supervenience the mental state corresponding to the superposition will
also have these mental properties. In the quantum context, an important
and widely-discussed example of such mental properties is whether or not
a mental state has a definite conscious experience. When considering the
measurement of an observer, this mental property is whether or not the ob-
server is consciously aware of a definite record after the measurement. This
property is independent of what specific record the observer obtains.3 Then
by the above analysis, the mental state corresponding to the above super-
position (4) also has this mental property, which means that the quantum
observer M in the superposition is consciously aware of a definite record
after the measurement.
A weaker form of this result can be obtained by a different reasoning
(Albert, 1992; Barrett, 1999). Here is the argument. In the above example,
suppose that M has the disposition to answer the question “Did you get
a definite result to your x-spin measurement?” with “Yes” if she recorded
x-spin up (if M + S ended up in the state |up〉S |up〉M ) and with “Yes” if she
recorded x-spin down (if M + S ended up in the state |down〉S |down〉M ).
Then if M + S is in a superposition of these two states, such as (4), then
it follows from the linearity of the dynamics that M will answer “Yes” to
the same question; that is, M will report that she got a definite x-spin
record.4 This result can also be obtained by an argument using reduction
to absurdity (see also Barrett, 1998; Magnus, 2004). Assuming that if M +
S is in a superposition of |up〉S |up〉M and |down〉S |down〉M , M will report
that she did not get a definite x-spin record. Then since an appropriate
superposition of two such superpositions may also be the state |up〉S |up〉M
or |down〉S |down〉M , M will also report that she did not get a definite x-
spin record when she determinately recorded x-spin up or x-spin down by
the linearity of the dynamics. This leads to a contradiction.
2Here it is implicitly assumed that for the same observer each of these mental properties
supervenes on one and only part of the whole physical state underlying the mental state.
3Moreover, the observer can also determine whether she has this mental property by
introspection, and the determination may not depend on the specific record she obtains
either.
4In our view, the linearity of the dynamics seems not necessary for the argument. M’s
report can be represented by a physical state. And the physical state corresponding to
her “Yes” report is a common factor which can be picked out from the superposition (4).
Thus M’s report is still “Yes” when she is in the superposition.
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This argument is not based on the doctrine of psychophysical superve-
nience, and its conclusion is weaker than the result we obtained based on
the doctrine. However, when assuming that a qualified observer can cor-
rectly report her mental content, this result will be equivalent to the result
we obtained. Therefore, along two different lines of reasoning, we can argue
that a quantum observer, who is physically in a superposition state like (4),
also has a definite conscious experience.
3 The either/or puzzle
Before moving on to analyzing what definite conscious experience a quantum
observer has, we need to pause to first solve a puzzle. The puzzle concerns a
different question one can ask in the above weaker argument (Albert, 1992;
Barrett, 1999).
Suppose that M is asked not with the question “Did you get a definite
result to your x-spin measurement?”, but with the question “Did you get
some definite result to your x-spin measurement, either x-spin up or x-spin
down?” Then the same observer M will also have the disposition to answer
this question with “Yes” if she recorded x-spin up (if M + S ended up
in the state |up〉S |up〉M ) and with “Yes” if she recorded x-spin down (if
M + S ended up in the state |down〉S |down〉M ). Then if M + S is in a
superposition of these two states, (4), it follows from a similar analysis that
M will also answer “Yes” to the question; that is, M will report that she got
a definite x-spin result, either x-spin up or x-spin down. However, M in fact
fails to have either definite record when she is physically in the superposition
(4). We call this puzzle the either/or puzzle. It thus seems that the previous
assumption that a qualified observer can correctly report her mental content
is not always true in the quantum context. This also raises the doubt about
the correctness of M’s report that she got a definite x-spin result when she
is physically in the superposition (4).
According to the well-known solution to this puzzle (Albert, 1992; Bar-
rett, 1999), M will indeed report that she got a definite x-spin result, either
x-spin up or x-spin down, when she is physically in the superposition (4),
but the report is false. This means that even a qualified observer cannot
know what she is currently experiencing and what she had experienced, and
she will be fundamentally mistaken concerning the basic nature of her con-
scious experience. The resulting theory is called the bare theory (Albert,
1992), which has many serious problems such as the empirical incoherence
problem (which is that if the theory were true, we would have no empiri-
cal evidence to confirm that it is true) (Barrett, 1996, 1999; Dickson, 1998;
Magnus, 2004). However, although the bare theory is generally rejected due
to these serious problems, it seems that the origin of the either/or puzzle
has not been deeply analyzed.
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Let us compare the two questions “Did you get a definite result to your
x-spin measurement?” and “Did you get some definite result to your x-spin
measurement, either x-spin up or x-spin down?”. The difference lies in
that the second question also concerns the specific result of measurement,
while the first question does not. In order to answer the second question,
the observer M must first know the content of her immediate conscious
experience or memory about the measurement result. Moreover, only after
an either/or logical analysis can she give an answer to the question. (In
contrast, M needs not know her specific mental content to answer the first
question.) Therefore, the fact that M fails to have either definite record
will not result in the mental illusion assumed by the bare theory; rather,
it will result in the negative answer of M to the second question, and this
report is true. Concretely speaking, since the mental states corresponding
to the physical states |up〉M and |down〉M differ in their mental content, the
observer M being in the superposition (4) will have a conscious experience
different from the experience of M being in each branch of the superposition
by the symmetry of the two branches. In other words, the result that M
is consciously aware of is neither x-spin up nor x-spin down when she is
physically in the superposition (4). Thus M will, in fact, answer “No”, not
“Yes”, to the second question, “Did you get some definite result to your
x-spin measurement, either x-spin up or x-spin down?” (if she is a qualified
and honest observer). 5
It is worth noting that even though the observer M being in the super-
position (4)) has a (definite) disjunctive conscious experience, such as “I
am consciously aware of a result, either x-spin up or x-spin down” (Barrett,
1999), the conscious experience is also different from the experience of M
being in each branch of the superposition. If the question “Did you get
some definite result to your x-spin measurement, either x-spin up or x-spin
down?” means that “Are you consciously aware of a x-spin up result or a
x-spin down result to your x-spin measurement?”, then M’s answer to the
question will be still “No”, not “Yes”.
This solution to the either/or puzzle makes the invalidity of the bare
theory more obvious. Moreover, the solution also helps clear the doubt about
the validity of the previous assumption that a qualified observer can correctly
report her mental content in the quantum context, and in particular, the
correctness of M’s report that she got a definite x-spin result when she is
physically in the superposition (4).
5Another way to understanding this result is to notice that since the mental states
corresponding to the physical states |up〉M and |down〉M are incompatible in their mental
content, there is no common part of the two physical states on which the mental content of
the observer M being in a superposition of them can supervene. As a result, even though
the observer M being in each branch of the superposition answers “Yes” to a question
concerning her mental content, she cannot give the same answer to the question when she
is in the superposition.
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4 Implications for solving the measurement prob-
lem
According to the above analysis, when an ideal x-spin observer measures
the x-spin of a spin-l/2 system being in a superposition of x-spin up and
x-spin down, she will be consciously aware of a definite record, which is
neither x-spin up nor x-spin down. This new result, if it is valid, will have
implications for solving the measurement problem.
4.1 Everett’s approach
Let us first analyze Everett’s approach to quantum mechanics. This ap-
proach claims that after the above quantum measurement there will be two
observers, each of who is consciously aware of a definite record, either x-spin
up or x-spin down.
There are in general two ways of understanding the notion of multiplic-
ity in Everett’s approach. One is the strong form which claims that there
are two physical observers (in material content) after the quantum measure-
ment (e.g. DeWitt and Graham, 1973). The above new result, which is
based on the assumption that there is still one physical observer after the
quantum measurement, has no implications for this view, which is consis-
tent with the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. As is well known,
however, this view has serious problems such as violation of mass-energy
conservation and inconsistency with the dynamical equations (Albert and
Loewer, 1988). The problem of inconsistency can also be seen as follows.
The existence of many worlds is only relative to decoherent observers, not
relative to non-decoherent observers, who can measure the whole superpo-
sition corresponding to the many worlds (e.g. by protective measurements)
and confirm that there is no increase in the total mass-energy and number
of particles.
The other way of understanding the notion of multiplicity is the weak
form which claims that there is one physical observer (in material content),
but there are two mental observers or two mental states of the same physical
observer after the quantum measurement. Wallace’s (2012) latest formula-
tion of Everett’s approach is arguably this view in nature (see also Kent,
2010).6 Our new result, which is also based on the assumption that there is
still one physical observer after the quantum measurement, will have impli-
cations for this view.
The difference between the prediction of the weak form of Everett’s ap-
proach and our result is obvious. Let us see where the difference originates
from. In order to derive the multiplicity prediction of Everett’s approach,
6Note that in Wallace’s formulation it is claimed that there are also two emergent
physical observers, but their existence is only in the sense of branch structure (i.e. the
structure of certain parts of a whole physical state), not in the sense of material content.
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the mental state of a conscious observer cannot always supervene on her
whole physical state. For each of the physical states |up〉M and |down〉M ,
the mental state directly supervenes on the whole physical state. But for
a superposition of these two physical states such as (4), the mental state
does not supervene on the whole physical state; rather, the mental state
supervenes only on a part of the whole physical state, such as one of the
two terms in the superposition (4), and as a result, a physical observer has
two distinct mental states at the same time. This obviously contradicts
the common assumption of psychophysical supervenience, which states that
the mental state of a conscious observer supervenes on her (whole) physical
state. Note that a whole physical state is independent, while any two parts
of the state are not independent; once one part is selected, the other part
will be also fixed. But a mental state is usually assumed to be autonomous.
Thus it is arguably that a mental state supervenes on a whole physical state,
not on any part of the state.
Although one may still object that this common assumption may be in-
valid in the quantum domain, one must explain why the assumption applies
to the physical states |up〉M and |down〉M , but not to any superposition of
them. It seems that the only difference one can think is that being in the
superposition the physical observer has no definite mental state which con-
tains a definite conscious experience about the measurement result, while
being in each branch of the superposition, |up〉M or |down〉M , she has a
definite mental state which contains a definite conscious experience about
the measurement result. According to our previous analysis, however, this
difference in fact does not exist; a physical observer being in the superpo-
sition also has a definite mental state which contains a definite conscious
experience about the measurement result. Note that these objections also
apply to the single-mind theory and many-minds theory.7
Finally, we give a brief comment on the relationship between Everett’s
approach and decoherence. It is usually thought that the appearance or
emergence of two observers after a quantum measurement with two possible
results is caused by decoherence. However, even if this claim is true for the
strong form of Everett’s approach, it cannot be true for the weak form of
Everett’s approach. The reason is that the generation of a superposed state
of a physical observer (e.g. a superposition of two physical states |up〉M and
|down〉M ), as well as the psychophysical supervenience, have nothing to do
with decoherence. In this sense, the weak form of Everett’s approach is more
like a many-minds theory than a many-worlds theory. Note again that in
the weak form of Everett’s approach the observer still has a whole physical
state after a quantum measurement. In our opinion, it is just the fuzzy
7It seems that these objections will be more serious for Wallace’s formulation of Ev-
erett’s approach, since in this formulation, which is arguably a weak form of Everett’s
approach too, there are no definite parts of the whole physical state on which the mental
states can supervene.
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border between a many-minds theory and a many-worlds theory that causes
much confusion in understanding Everett’s approach to quantum mechanics
(see also Kent, 2010).
4.2 Bohm’s approach
Let us now consider Bohm’s approach or the hidden-variables approach to
quantum mechanics. As to Bohm’s approach, an analysis of the psychophys-
ical supervenience is also relevant and necessary (Brown, 1996). In this ap-
proach, there are two possible forms of psychophysical supervenience. One
is that the mental state supervenes on both the wave function and the addi-
tional variables such as positions of Bohmian particles. The other is that the
mental state supervenes only on the additional variables such as positions
of Bohmian particles.
If assuming the first form of psychophysical supervenience, then our new
result will have implications for Bohm’s approach. On the wave function
part, the mental state of a quantum observer being in a superposition such
as (4) is also definite, and the mental content does not correspond to either
branch of the superposition. Then, even although the mental state of the
observer also contains the content corresponding to the branch occupied
by the Bohmian particles, the whole content does not correspond to either
branch of the superposition. Therefore, in this case Bohm’s approach cannot
solve the measurement problem, and is not consistent with the predictions
of standard quantum mechanics either.
It is usually thought that the mental state of a quantum observer being
in a superposition supervenes only on the branch of the superposition oc-
cupied by the Bohmian particles. Indeed, Bohm initially assumed this form
of psychophysical supervenience. He said: “the packet entered by the appa-
ratus [hidden] variable... determines the actual result of the measurement,
which the observer will obtain when she looks at the apparatus.” (Bohm,
1952, p.182). Brown and Wallace (2005) called this assumption Bohm’s re-
sult assumption, and they have presented convincing arguments against it
(see also Lewis, 2007). In our view, the main problem with this assumption
is that the occupied branch and other empty branches have the same onto-
logical status and ability to be supervened by the mental state. Moreover,
although it is imaginable that the Bohmian particles may have influences on
the occupied branch, e.g. disabling it from being supervened by the mental
state, it is hardly imaginable that the Bohmian particles have influences on
all other empty branches, e.g. disabling them from being supervened by the
mental state.
On the other hand, if assuming the second form of psychophysical su-
pervenience, namely assuming the mental state supervenes only on the po-
sitions of Bohmian particles, then our new result will have no implications
for Bohm’s approach, and it seems that the above inconsistency problem
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can also be avoided. Indeed, most Bohmians today seem to support this
assumption, though they often did not state it explicitly (see, e.g. Maudlin,
1995). However, it has been argued that this assumption also leads to a se-
rious problem of allowing superluminal signaling (Brown and Wallace 2005;
Lewis, 2007). In our view, this problem is not as deadly as the inconsistency
problem, since such superluminal signaling may exist in principle, and its
existence is not inconsistent with existing experience either (Gao, 2004).
The problem with this assumption is still the inconsistency problem.
Here is an argument. Consider again a quantum observer being in the
superposition (4). In Bohm’s approach, the Bohmian particles of the ob-
server reside in one branch of the superposition after the measurement,
which indicates that the observer obtains the result corresponding to the
branch. For example, when the Bohmian particles of the observer reside in
the branch |up〉M after the measurement, the observer obtains the x-spin up
result; while when the Bohmian particles of the observer reside in the branch
|down〉M after the measurement, the observer obtains the x-spin down re-
sult. Now suppose these two post-measurement situations appear in two
somewhat different experiments so that the Bohmian particles of the two
observers are located in the same positions. Then if assuming the second
form of psychophysical supervenience, namely assuming the mental state
supervenes only on the positions of Bohmian particles, then these two post-
measurement situations will represent the same measurement result. But
this is not the case; in the first situation the observer obtains the x-spin up
result, while in the second situation she obtains the x-spin down result.8
This analysis also raises a further doubt about the whole strategy of
Bohm’s approach to solving the measurement problem. Why add hidden
variables such as positions of Bohmian particles to quantum mechanics? It
has been thought that adding these variables which have definite values at
every instant is enough to ensure the definiteness of measurement results and
further solve the measurement problem. However, if the mental state cannot
supervene on these additional variables, then even though these variables
have definite values at every instant, they are unable to account for our
definite experience and thus do not help solve the measurement problem.
4.3 Dynamical collapse theories
We have argued that when considering the mental content of a quantum
observer being in a superposition such as (4), it seems that Everett’s and
Bohm’s approaches to quantum mechanics are not promising solutions to the
measurement problem. If a quantum observer being in a post-measurement
8This point was also emphasized by Barrett (1999, p.123). He said:“the content of a
measurement record in Bohm’s theory is determined by the position of something relative
to the wave function - that is, a different wave function and the same position might
produce a different record.”
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superposition like (4) indeed is consciously aware of a definite result, which is
not one of the possible results of the measurement, then the final state of the
observer after the measurement cannot be such a superposition. This means
that the linear quantum dynamics will be violated during the measurement.
Thus it seems that dynamical collapse theories are in the right direction to
solve the measurement problem.
However, it has been known that dynamical collapse theories are plagued
by the tails problem (Albert and Loewer, 1996). In particular, the structured
tails problem has not been solved in a satisfactory way (see McQueen, 2015
and references therein). The problem is essentially that dynamical collapse
theories such as the GRW theory predicts that the post-measurement state
is still a superposition of different outcome branches with similar structure
(although the modulus squared of the coefficient of one branch is close to
one), and they need to explain why high modulus-squared values are macro-
existence determiners (McQueen, 2015). In our view, the key to solving
the structured tails problem is not to analyze the connection between high
modulus-squared values and macro-existence, but to analyze the connection
between these values and our experience of the macroscopic world. This
brings us again to the question of what it feels like to be in a quantum
superposition.
5 What does a quantum observer observe?
Consider a quantum observer M being in the following superposition:
α |1〉P |1〉M + β |2〉P |2〉M , (5)
where |1〉P and |2〉P are the states of a pointer being centered in positions x1
and x2, respectively, |1〉M and |2〉M are the physical states of the observer
M who (consciously) observes the pointer being in positions x1 and x2,
respectively, and α and β, which are not zero, satisfy the normalization
condition |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. According to our previous analysis, a quantum
observer, who is physically in a superposition state like (5), also has a definite
conscious experience. The question now is: What does M observe when she
is physically in the above superposition state?
First of all, it can be seen that the mental content of the observer M
is related to the modulus squared of the amplitude of each branch of the
superposition she is physically in. When |α|2=1 and |β|2=0, M will observe
the pointer being only in position x1. When |α|2=0 and |β|2=1, M will
observe the pointer being only in position x2. When α = β = 1/
√
2, by
the symmetry of the two branches the mental content of M will be neither
the content of observing the pointer being in position x1 nor the content of
observing the pointer being in position x2.
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Next, it can be argued that the mental content of the observer M is also
related to the phase of each branch of the superposition she is physically in.
Assume this is not the case. Then when α = −β = 1/√2 and when α = β =
1/
√
2, the mental content of M will be the same, which is neither the content
of observing the pointer being in position x1 nor the content of observing
the pointer being in position x2. Then, by an analysis similar to that given
in Section 2, when M is in a superposition of these two physical states,
her mental content is still the same. However, since the superposition of
these two states is |1〉P |1〉M , the observer M being in this superposition will
observe the pointer being only in position x1. This leads to a contradiction.
Note that the mental content of M is only related to the relative phase of
each branch of the superposition she is physically in, since an overall phase
has no physical meaning, and two physical states with only a difference of
overall phase are in fact the same physical state.
Thirdly, it might be argued that the mental content of the observer M
contains both the content of observing the pointer being in position x1 and
the content of observing the pointer being in position x2. It is natural
to assume when the physical state changes continuously the corresponding
mental state also changes continuously. This means that when the amplitude
or phase of each branch of the superposition (5) changes continuously, the
mental content of the observer M also changes continuously. When |α|2=1,
M will observe the pointer being in position x1. While when |α|2=0, M will
not observe the pointer being in position x1. Then under this continuity
assumption, when |α|2 is close to one the mental content of M will still con-
tain the content of observing the pointer being in position x1. Moreover, it
seems also natural to assume for other values of |α|2 which are not zero, the
mental content of M will still contain the content of observing the pointer
being in position x1. Similarly, for all values of |β|2 which are not zero the
mental content of M will also contain the content of observing the pointer
being in position x2. However, the mental content of the observer M does
not contain the content of observing the pointer being in another position x3
which is different from x1 and x2, since the amplitude of the corresponding
term |3〉P |3〉M is exactly zero. To sum up, it is arguably that the mental
content of the observer M contains both the content of observing the pointer
being in position x1 and the content of observing the pointer being in po-
sition x2, which are also the only two parts of the whole mental content of
M.
In order to know how the partial contents constitute the whole mental
content of a quantum observer being in a superposition, we need to further
analyze how the amplitude and phase of each branch of the superposition
determine the mental content. This is a difficult task. And we can only
give a few speculations here. It seems reasonable to assume that the mental
property determined by the modulus squared of the amplitude is a certain
property of vividness of the conscious experience. For example, when |α|2
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is close to one the conscious experience of M observing the pointer being
in position x1 is the most vivid, while when |α|2 is close to zero, the con-
scious experience of M observing the pointer being in position x1 is the least
vivid. In particular, when |α|2 = |β|2 = 1/2, the conscious experience of
M observing the pointer being in position x1 and the conscious experience
of M observing the pointer being in position x2 have the same intermediate
vividness. However, it is more difficult to conjecture the nature of the men-
tal property determined by the relative phase. It is most probably a new
property which we don’t know and have not experienced either.
The above analysis of the mental content of a quantum observer, though
it is speculative, may help solve the structured tails problem of dynamical
collapse theories. In particular, if assuming the modulus squared of the
amplitude of each branch indeed determines the vividness of the mental
content corresponding to the branch, then the structured tails problem can
be readily solved. Under this assumption, when the modulus squared of the
amplitude of a branch is close to zero, the mental content corresponding
to the branch will be the least vivid. It is conceivable that below a certain
threshold of vividness an ordinary observer or even an ideal observer will not
be consciously aware of the corresponding mental content. Then even though
in dynamical collapse theories the post-measurement state of an observer is
still a superposition of different outcome branches with similar structure, the
observer can only be consciously aware of the mental content corresponding
to the branch with very high amplitude, and the branches with very low
amplitude will have no corresponding mental content appearing in the whole
mental content of the observer. This will solve the structured tails problem
of dynamical collapse theories.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we suggest a new answer to the question of what it feels like
to be a quantum observer, and argue that the answer may have implications
for the solutions to the measurement problem. Our main strategy is to apply
the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience in our analysis. Based on this
doctrine, we first argue that a quantum observer has a definite conscious
experience, which is neither disjunctive nor illusive. The inconsistency of
this result with the bare theory is resolved, and it is shown that that an
appropriate use of the strategy of analyzing the disposition of an observer to
answer a particular question also leads to the same result. We then analyze
possible implications of this new result for the solutions to the measurement
problem. It is argued that Everett’s and Bohm’s approaches to quantum
mechanics are disfavored when considering the doctrine of psychophysical
supervenience. This suggests that dynamical collapse theories are in the
right direction to solve the measurement problem. In order to solve the
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structured tails problem of these theories, we further analyze the concrete
content of the conscious experience of a quantum observer. It is argued that
the mental content of a quantum observer is related to both the amplitude
and relative phase of each branch of the superposition she is physically in,
and it is composed of the mental content corresponding to every branch of
the superposition. In addition, we argue that when assuming the modulus
squared of the amplitude of each branch determines the vividness of the
mental content corresponding to the branch, the structured tails problem
can be solved.
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